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is attributable to its ruling that the Goggins standard was satisfied,
or whether it believed that such interest is minimal, must, regretta-
bly, await further clarification.
Alan Sorkowitz
Police failure to permit defendant to contact mother violates right
to assistance of counsel, requiring suppression of confession
Prearraignment or indictment statements elicited from an un-
represented defendant who voluntarily has waived his right to coun-
sel 219 in the absence of an attorney are admissible against him. 2°
the appropriate authorities and to cooperate in efforts to apprehend criminals. See Roviaro
v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957); M. HARNEY & J. CROSS, THE INFORMER iN LAw
ENFORCEMENT 100-06 (2d ed. 1968); 2 COLUM. J. OF L. & Soc. PROB. 47 (1966). While many
informants volunteer their aid to law enforcement officials in return for plea bargaining
concessions or recommendations for lighter sentences, see HARNEY & CROSS, supra, at 41-42,
it also is true that law-abiding citizens quite frequently serve as informants. Id. at 31-41.
Indeed, this tactic has proven particularly effective in the legal offensive against narcotics.
See id. at 26; Informant's Identity, supra note 188, at 562.
2I See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The defendant's right to counsel attaches upon the
commencement of "adversary judicial criminal proceedings" against him. Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). In New York, this critical stage of the prosecution has been held to
commence at the time of indictment, People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 549-51, 166 N.E.2d
825, 828-29, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21, 24-25 (1960), arraignment, People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 164,
182 N.E.2d 103, 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (1962), and court-ordered prearraignment lineups,
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970); People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 225-26, 371
N.E.2d 819, 822, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59-60 (1977). See generally The Survey, note 258 infra.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that a defendant must be afforded the right to counsel
in any pretrial confrontation after indictment where there is a "potential [for] substantial
prejudice to defendant's rights . . . and . . . counsel [would be able] to help avoid that
prejudice." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967); see Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967).
220 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court held that the prosecution may
not use statements elicited from a defendant under custodial interrogation unless, prior to
the questioning, the defendant had been advised of his sixth amendment right to counsel and
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 444. According to Miranda,
however, a defendant may waive these rights outside the presence of an attorney if the waiver
is made voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly. Id. at 475; see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 404 (1977); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
Under New York law, however, once an attorney has entered the proceedings, a waiver
by the defendant may be made only in the presence of his lawyer. People v. Hobson, 39
N.Y.2d 479, 481-82, 348 N.E.2d 894, 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (1976), discussed in The
Survey, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 201, 216 (1976); see People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325,239 N.E.2d
537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243
N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963). Furthermore, following indictment or arraignment, the defendant may
not waive his right to counsel in the absence of an attorney. People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154,
162-63, 385 N.E.2d 612, 616, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 879 (1978), discussed in The Survey, notes
258-286 and accompanying text infra.
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Deliberate efforts to conceal a defendant from likely avenues to the
assistance of an attorney constitute a denial of his right to counsel,
however, and require the suppression of any statements elicited
from him during such concealment. 22' Recently, in People v.
Bevilacqua,2 the Court of Appeals broadened this rule when it held
that, despite an express waiver of his right to counsel, an unrepre-
sented defendant's oral confession must be suppressed where the
police had ignored his requests to call his mother and seemingly had
schemed to isolate him from the assistance of an attorney.22s
Bevilacqua, the 18-year-old defendant, was arrested at 7:15
p.m. for a murder which occurred in Greenburgh, New York.224 Due
"I See People v. Townsend, 33 N.Y.2d 37, 41, 300 N.E.2d 722, 724, 347 N.Y.S.2d 187,
190 (1973). In Townsend, the 17-year-old defendant voluntarily went into the police station
where he was held for questioning. Id. at 39, 300 N.E.2d at 723, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 188. During
the interrogation, the defendant's mother repeatedly telephoned the police station in an
attempt to contact her son. Each time, the police informed her that the defendant was not
at the station. Id. at 39-40, 300 N.E.2d at 723-24, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 189. Meanwhile, the
defendant, without the benefit of Miranda warnings, made three incriminating statements
which subsequently were suppressed. Id. at 39 & n.2, 300 N.E.2d at 723 & n.2, 347 N.Y.S.2d
at 188-89 & n.2. At the trial for robbery and murder, a fourth written statement, signed by
the defendant after he had been given his Miranda warnings, was admitted into evidence
against him, and he was convicted. Id. at 40-41, 300 N.E.2d at 724, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 189-90.
The appellate division affirmed the conviction, 36 App. Div. 2d 749, 329 N.Y.S.2d 891 (2d
Dep't 1971), but the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, 33 N.Y.2d at 41-42,
300 N.E.2d at 724-25, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 190-91..
The Court of Appeals held that the written statement should have been excluded from
the evidence. Id. According to the Townsend Court,
[I~t [was] impermissible for the police to use a confession, even if it [were]
otherwise voluntary, obtained from a 17-year-old defendant when, in the course of
extracting such confession, they [had] sealed off the most likely avenue by which
the assistance of counsel may [have] reach[ed] him by means of deception and
trickery.
Id. at 41, 300 N.E.2d at 724, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 190. The Townsend Court was careful to
distinguish People v. Hocking, 15 N.Y.2d 973, 207 N.E.2d 529, 259 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1965), and
People v. Taylor, 16 N.Y.2d 1038, 213 N.E.2d 321, 265 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1965), where the
confessions of the respective defendants were admitted notwithstanding that the police had
refused to permit the defendants to see their families. The Townsend Court noted that the
families in both Hocking and Taylor knew where the defendants were being questioned and
were free to obtain counsel for them and that the police had not schemed "to conceal the
presence of the defendant[s] or to deceive the famil[ies] when inquiry was made." 33
N.Y.2d at 42, 300 N.E.2d at 725, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 191 (quoting the dissenting opinion of the
appellate division at 36 App. Div. 2d 749, 750, 320 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (2d Dep't 1971) (Hop-
kins, J., dissenting)).
45 N.Y.2d 508, 382 N.E.2d 1326, 410 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1979).
2" Id. at 514-15, 382 N.E.2d at 1329, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 552-53.
211 Id. at 511-12, 382 N.E.2d at 1327, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 550-51. The defendant and three
other men allegedly had planned to rob the owner of a liquor store. Id. at 511, 382 N.E.2d at
1327, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 550. The owner was shot and killed after he had been persuaded to
drive the defendant and one of the other men home. Id. at 511, 382 N.E.2d at 1327, 410
N.Y.S.2d at 551.
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to an alleged lack of processing facilities in Greenburgh, the defen-
dant was taken to a police station in the neighboring community of
Elmsford.22 There, the defendant was given Miranda warnings, and
although he did not demand the presence of a lawyer, he asked twice
to contact his mother. 26 The police ignored his requests and Bevi-
lacqua made an oral confession between 10:00 and 10:15 p.m. 2  In
the meantime, a former attorney of the defendant 28 learned of his
arrest 229 and telephoned the Greenburgh police station between
10:15 and 10:30 p.m., leaving instructions to refrain from any inter-
rogation of his client. 3' At 11:15 p.m., the defendant signed a writ-
ten confession at the Elmsford station.21
At a pretrial suppression hearing only the written confession
was suppressed. 212 Bevilacqua subsequently was convicted of two
counts of murder in the second degree.23 The Appellate Division,
"2 Id. at 512, 382 N.E.2d at 1327, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 551. The defendant and the other
suspects were arrested in White Plains 11 days after the shooting had occurred. Id. The
alleged lack of facilities for processing multiple defendants caused the defendants to be taken
to Elmsford while the other men were sent to the Tarrytown police station. Id.; see id. at 518,
382 N.E.2d at 1331, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 555 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 512, 382 N.E.2d at 1327, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
2 Id., 382 N.E.2d at 1328, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
2 The lawyer had represented the defendant as well as his family several times in the
past. Id. at 518, 382 N.E.2d at 1331, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 555 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
2n Id. at 512, 382 N.E.2d at 1328, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 551. After the attorneys of two of the
other suspects had been notified of the arrests and had located their clients, one of the lawyers
telephoned the defendant's attorney to inform him of the defendant's arrest. Id.
230 Id. The exact location of the defendant had no bearing on the effectiveness of his
attorney's directive to another police station to cease interrogation. 45 N.Y.2d at 514, 382
N.E.2d at 1329, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 552; see People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 232, 205 N.E.2d
852, 855, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924, 928 (1965); note 232 infra.
231 Id. at 512, 382 N.E.2d at 1328, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 551. After the defendant's statement
had been signed and verified, the police telephoned the defendant's parents. Id. Meanwhile,
the defendant's lawyer had arrived at the Greenburgh headquarters at 11:00 p.m., but was
not told that the defendant was in Elmsford. Id. He was instructed to wait while the defen-
dant was processed. Id. At around midnight, the defendant was taken to the Greenburgh
station and at 12:37 a.m., he met with his attorney. Id. at 513, 382 N.E.2d at 1328, 410
N.Y.S.2d at 551.
212 Id. It was determined at the pretrial hearing that only the written statement should
be suppressed since it had been obtained after the police deliberately had interfered with the
defendant's lawyer's attempts to consult with his client. Id.; see note 220 supra. Once the
attorney contacted the Greenburgh station, see note 12 and accompanying text supra, he was
involved in the proceeding, and the defendant could not waive his right to counsel unless the
attorney was present. See note 220 supra. Thus, the written statement had to be suppressed
notwithstanding that it was given in Elmsford. See People v. Garofolo, 46 N.Y.2d 592, 600,
389 N.E.2d 123, 126, 415 N.Y.S.2d 810, 813-14 (1979); People v. Pinzon, 44 N.Y.2d 458, 463-
65, 377 N.E.2d 721, 724-25, 406 N.Y.S.2d 268, 270-71 (1978).
45 N.Y.2d at 513, 382 N.E.2d at 1328, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 551. The defendant was tried
separately from the other suspects. Id.
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Second Department, affirmed, and the defendant appealed. 4
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the conduct of the
police required suppression of the prior oral confession. 5 Chief
Judge Breitel, writing for the majority,28 stated that Bevilacqua's
constitutionally protected right to counsel had been denied since the
effect of the police conduct was to isolate him "from two of his most
likely avenues of assistance, his mother and his lawyer. ' ' 217 In so
concluding, the Bevilacqua majority found its earlier decision in
People v. Townsend3 ' analogous. 9 The Townsend Court sup-
pressed a confession made after the police, "through deception and
trickery," had concealed the whereabouts of a 17-year-old defendant
from his mother.2 0 Although admitting that the comparison to
Townsend was not "perfect, ' 24' the Bevilacqua Court determined
that the police tactics as a whole exacerbated their failure to comply
with the defendant's requests to contact his mother. 2 2 The Court
also acknowledged that Bevilacqua's lawyer did not become in-
volved in the proceedings until after the defendant had confessed
orally.243 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the statement had
to be suppressed since the "seemingly conscious scheme" by the
police to prevent the defendant from receiving legal advice24 caused
9' 56 App. Div. 2d 605, 391 N.Y.S.2d 641 (2d Dep't 1977).
45 N.Y.2d at 515, 382 N.E.2d at 1329, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
23 Chief Judge Breitel was joined by Judges Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and
Cooke. Judge Jasen dissented in a separate opinion.
2 45 N.Y.2d at 511, 382 N.E.2d at 1327, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 550. The actions of the police
were deemed to have eliminated any prospect of Bevilacqua's obtaining legal advice before
submitting to interrogation. The Court noted that, after the police had refused to contact the
defendant's mother, adequate representation was foreclosed since "[ilt was only natural that
[the defendant, 18 years old at the time,] should regard his mother, rather than a lawyer,
as a primary source of help and advice." Id. at 513, 382 N.E.2d at 1328, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
- 33 N.Y.2d 37, 300 N.E.2d 722, 347 N.Y.S.2d 187 (1973).
21' 45 N.Y.2d at 513-14, 382 N.E.2d at 1328, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
240 33 N.Y.2d at 41, 300 N.E.2d at 724, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 190; see note 221 supra.
2 1 45 N.Y.2d at 513, 382 N.E.2d at 1328, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 552. The Court noted three
distinctions. The defendant in Townsend was a minor while Bevilacqua was not; Townsend's
mother was deliberately lied to while Bevilacqua's mother simply was not contacted; and
Townsend never received proper preinterrogation warnings. Id. at 513-14, 382 N.E.2d at 1328-
29, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
12 Id. at 514, 382 N.E.2d at 1329, 410N.Y.S.2d at 552.
213 Id. The Court found that, although the defendant's lawyer was not involved in the
proceedings until after the oral confession was made, he "undoubtedly" would have been
involved earlier even if the defendant's latest request to see his mother had been honored.
Id.
244 Id. The Bevilacqua Court noted that the essential element of the scheme involved "the
isolation of Bevilacqua, his transportation to a police station different from that to which the
other perpetrators had been taken, [the] failure to honor the defendant's request to see his
mother, and [the] refusal to allow the [defendant's] lawyer . . . to see his client." Id. at
514-15, 382 N.E.2d at 1329, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
1979] 1 853
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the "nice distinctions separating the first confession from the second
[to] lose much of their validity." '45
Judge Jasen, dissenting, declared that the dispositive issue was
whether Bevilacqua "was fully capable of voluntarily and intelli-
gently waiving his right to counsel without prior notification to his
mother."2 Focusing on Bevilacqua's personal rather than his legal
capacity to effectively waive his right to counsel,247 the dissent noted
that Bevilacqua had reached his majority and was "not a novice to
the criminal justice system." '48 Judge Jasen maintained that, in-
stead of requiring suppression, the police misconduct was only one
factor to consider in determining whether the defendant knowingly
waived his right to counsel and voluntarily confessed to the
crimes.249 Stating that the police activities "did not offend estab-
lished notions of fundamental fairness, "2 the dissent found unper-
suasive the analogy to the Townsend case since the police had not
affirmatively prevented Bevilacqua's mother from communicating
with him.21 Judge Jasen concluded that the evidence supported the
suppression court's finding of voluntariness and therefore should
have been upheld. 2
Id. at 514, 382 N.E.2d at 1329, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
4 Id. at 515, 382 N.E.2d at 1329, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 553 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
= Id. at 516-17, 382 N.E.2d at 1330, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 554 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
2,8 Id. at 516, 382 N.E.2d at 1330, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 554 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Id. at 516-17, 382 N.E.2d at 1330, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 554 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Judge
Jasen referred to People v. Carbonaro, 21 N.Y.2d 271, 234 N.E.2d 433, 287 N.Y.S.2d 385
(1967), wherein a 28-year-old defendant confessed to participating in an armed robbery after
the police had refused to allow him to telephone his wife. Id. at 275-76, 234 N.E.2d at 435,
287 N.Y.S.2d at 388-89. The Carbonaro Court found that the police misconduct did not per
se render the defendant's confession involuntary. Id. at 277, 234 N.E.2d at 436, 287 N.Y.S.2d
at 390-91 (citing People v. Hocking, 18 N.Y.2d 832, 833, 222 N.E.2d 600, 601, 275 N.Y.S.2d
838, 839 (1965)). Rather, noting the defendant's age, prior arrests and convictions, the Court
stated that "[t]his, of course, [did] not mean that he may not have had a right to speak to
his family; rather, it [was] relevant in considering the effect upon him of the denial of that
right." 21 N.Y.2d at 278, 234 N.E.2d at 437, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 391; see note 253 infra.
'10 45 N.Y.2d at 519, 382 N.E.2d at 1332, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 555 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
I Id. at 518-19, 382 N.E.2d at 1331, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 555; (Jasen, J., dissenting); see
generally notes 221, 240, & 241 supra. Judge Jasen found the police behavior to be more
egregious in Townsend since, in that case, "the police secured the critical confession only after
long hours of interrogation and after three oral confessions, inadmissible because of a failure
to advise defendant of his rights, had been extracted from the defendant." 45 N.Y.2d at 518-
19, 382 N.E.2d at 1331, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 555 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Judge Jasen also noted
that Townsend "was not as criminally experienced as" Bevilacqua. Id.
-2 45 N.Y.2d at 515, 382 N.E.2d at 1329, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 553. Since the question of
voluntariness is one of fact, the dissent stated that the suppression court's determination
should not be reversed unless predicated "on clearly insufficient evidence." Id. (citations
omitted).
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It is submitted that the Bevilacqua majority imprudently ex-
panded the "denial of access" theory implemented in Townsend. 53
Unlike the deliberate efforts to conceal the defendant and the con-
comitant failure to administer Miranda warnings in Townsend, "
the police never denied having Bevilacqua in custody and did advise
him of his right to the assistance of counsel.255 The Bevilacqua Court
apparently has ruled that, where the police activity may have se-
vered a possible path to legal advice, notwithstanding an otherwise
knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, any statement
subsequently elicited must be suppressed.2 16 Moreover, the decision
comes dangerously close to equating a request to contact a family
member to a request for counsel.2s7 It is- suggested that, if Bevilac-
See generally note 221 and accompanying text supra.
21, See notes 221 & 241 supra. An additional distinction between Townsend and
Bevilacqua is that Townsend involved the admissibility of a written confession, preceded by
Miranda warnings, which had been given subsequent to oral statements that were clearly
inadmissible in the absence of prior Miranda warnings. See 33 N.Y.2d at 40-41, 300 N.E.2d
at 724, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 189-90. In such a case, the voluntariness issue is further complicated
by the fact that the defendant may feel constrained to be consistent with the statements he
made in response to police interrogation prior to the Miranda admonitions. See, e.g., United
States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947); People v. Chapple, 38 N.Y.2d 112, 341 N.E.2d 243, 378
N.Y.S.2d 682 (1975); People v. Valerius, 31 N.Y.2d 51, 286 N.E.2d 254, 334 N.Y.S.2d 871
(1972); People v. Tanner, 30 N.Y.2d 102,282 N.E.2d 98, 331 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1972). In Bevilacqua,
where the issue was the admissibility of an oral statement given prior to an inadmissible
written statement, there was no problem with the possible coercive effect of the pressure to
be consistent. See People v. Byrne, 47 N.Y.2d 117, 122, 390 N.E.2d 760, 763, 417 N.Y.S.2d
42, 44 (1979); People v. Chapple, 38 N.Y.2d 112, 115, 341 N.E.2d 243, 245-46, 378 N.Y.S.2d
682, 685 (1975); People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 232-33, 205 N.E.2d 852, 855-56, 257
N.Y.S.2d 924, 929 (1965).
45 N.Y.2d at 512, 382 N.E.2d at 1327-28, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
n See id. at 513, 382 N.E.2d at 1327-28, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
15 Prior to Bevilacqua, the Court of Appeals had indicated that the denial of access to a
family member was not, of itself, sufficient to exclude a subsequent confession. See People
v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35, 40-41, 364 N.E.2d 1318, 1321-22, 396 N.Y.S.2d 625, 629 (1977);
People v. Townsend, 33 N.Y.2d 37, 41, 300 N.E.2d 722, 725, 347 N.Y.S.2d 187, 191 (1973);
People v. Carbonaro, 21 N.Y.2d 271, 278, 234 N.E.2d 433, 437, 287 N.Y.S.2d 385, 390-91
(1967); People v. Taylor, 16 N.Y.2d 1038, 1039-40, 213 N.E.2d 321, 321, 265 N.Y.S.2d 913,
913 (1965); People v. Hocking, 15 N.Y.2d 973, 974-75, 207 N.E.2d 529, 529, 259 N.Y.S.2d 859,
860 (1965); note 249 supra. The Bevilacqua Court, however, concluded that, by preventing
the defendant from communicating with his mother, the police effectively denied the defen-
dant the assistance of counsel. 45 N.Y.2d at 513, 382 N.E.2d at 1328, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 552;
see notes 235-245 and accompanying text supra.
It is interesting to note the strict requirement in the federal courts of a request for an
attorney as a condition precedent to the invocation of Miranda protections and fifth amend-
ment rights. In Fare v. Michael C., 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the
16-year-old defendant's request to see his probation officer did not warrant suppression of the
fruits of the continued interrogation. Id. at 2571. The Court based its conclusion on the
observations that the rigidity of the Miranda rule is justified by the "specificity" of its
instructions to law enforcement officials and the unique role of the attorney as protector of
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qua's waiver was indeed voluntary and his request to contact his
mother unequivalent to a request for counsel, the oral confession
should not have been suppressed.
Apparently implicit in the Bevilacqua holding is an admonish-
ment to law enforcement officials to refrain from conducting interro-
gations in any manner that would give even the appearance of an
effort to deny an unrepresented defendant access to a lawyer. It is
suggested that this underlying policy consideration, while laudatory
in principle, was accorded disproportionate weight in Bevilacqua
and thereby produced an unfortunate precedent.
Andrew A. Peterson
Postindictment waiver of right to counsel ineffective in absence of
attorney
New York courts long have recognized that a represented defen-
dant can waive his right to counsel only in the presence of his attor-
ney, and that any statements elicited in his attorney's absence must
be suppressed."'9 In People v. Coleman,"' the Court of Appeals
the defendant's legal rights. Id. at 2568-71. The proposition that a defendant's request to
speak with a family member is to be deemed a request for counsel stands in stark contrast to
the Supreme Court's critical observation: "If it were otherwise, a juvenile's request for almost
anyone he considered trustworthy enough to give him reliable advice would trigger the rigid
rule of Miranda." Id. at 2571.
"I People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976). The right
to counsel in New York was developed in a series of cases, along with the point at which the
defendant could waive that right without the advice of an attorney. In the first of these
decisions, the Court held that statements made by a defendant in the absence of his attorney
at an interrogation following his indictment were inadmissible. People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d
544, 551, 166 N.E.2d 825, 828, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21, 28 (1960). In People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d
561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961), the Court unequivocally found that the return
of an indictment is the point at which the right to counsel attaches since it "marks the formal
commencement of the criminal action against the defendant." Id. at 565, 175 N.E.2d at 447-
48, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 74-75. A year later, the Court declared that a "post-arraignment state-
ment should not be treated any differently than a post-indictment statement," and is inad-
missible when elicited from a defendant in either situation in the absence of counsel. People
v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 164, 182 N.E.2d 103, 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (1962). The right
to counsel was found to exist at the preindictment or prearraignment stages of a criminal
proceeding in People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 152-53, 193 N.E.2d 628, 630, 243 N.Y.S.2d
841, 844 (1963). The Court seemingly equated the filing of a criminal information with the
return of an indictment in People v. Bodie, 16 N.Y.2d 275, 213 N.E.2d 441, 266 N.Y.S.2d 104
(1965). The Court concluded that post-information statements elicited from a defendant in
